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SECURING ONLINE TRANSACTIONS:
CRIME PREVENTION IS THE KEY
Michael Ena*
What we . . . must confront today is an entirely new breed of
criminal—one that transcends geographic boundaries or borders
with a high degree of stealth and anonymity.  We have witnessed
the emergence of the professional Cybercriminal, a foe at home
and abroad that continuously probes our critical infrastructure
for weakness and vulnerability, in order to victimize the Ameri-
can public in a multitude of ways, and profit from our loss.
James M. Sheehan,
Special Agent in Charge, Criminal Division,
FBI Los Angeles.1
INTRODUCTION
The commercial use of the Internet came as an afterthought.
The Internet’s original designers aimed to create a communication
system resilient in the face of a nuclear attack, not a secure net-
work for business and consumer transactions.2  A widespread use
of commodity operating systems and software products delivering
rich functionality but lacking security aggravated the problem.3  Vi-
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2009; M.S., Computer Sci-
ence, New York University; Ph.D., Physical and Mathematical Science, Moscow Uni-
versity; B.S., M.S., Applied Mathematics and Computer Science, Moscow University;
Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP).  The author would like
to thank Professor Alexander H. Southwell for his comments on this work.
1. Press Release, FBI Los Angeles, Operation Web Snare Leads to Charges in
Los Angeles Against High-Tech, Intellectual Property Offenders (Aug. 26, 2004),
http://losangeles.fbi.gov/pressrel/2004/websnare082604.htm [hereinafter FBI Press
Release].
2. See, e.g., Scott Charney, The Internet, Law Enforcement and Security, 662 PLI/
PAT 937, 943 (2001).
3. See, e.g., Fred Volgelstein, Why Hackers Are a Giant Threat to Microsoft’s Fu-
ture, FORTUNE, Oct. 18, 2004, at 263 (noting that until recently, Microsoft did not
write programs with the hacker threat in mind focusing instead on the stability of its
Windows operating systems and adding new features to its software); see also Larry
Greenemeier, Underground Buzz on New Bots, INFO.WK., Oct. 9, 2006, at 44 [herein-
after Greenemeier, Buzz on New Bots ](noting that operating system monoculture
facilitates hacker attacks and proliferation of malicious software); Gregg Keizer, Ex-
ploit-for-Sale Hacker Pins Bug on Vista’s E-Mail App, COMPUTERWORLD, Mar. 23,
2007, available at http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=Print
ArticleBasic&articleId=901419; Robert McMillan, New IE7 Bug Could Help
Phishers, IDG NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 14, 2007, available at http://www.computerworld.
147
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ruses, worms, and hacker attacks caused tremendous damage and
made securing Internet communications and Internet-connected
computer systems the primary concern of software vendors and in-
formation technology (“IT”) professionals.4  A patchwork of tech-
nologies and software products emerged to protect computer
systems and to make the Internet suitable for commercial use.5
By offering an inexpensive global communication medium, the
Internet enabled businesses to provide information and deliver in-
novative products and services to a much wider audience of con-
sumers around the corner or around the world.6  For retailers,
moving mail order business to the Internet expanded their cus-
tomer base and reduced their costs.7  The financial industry, espe-
cially global banking and financial services companies, quickly
recognized and leveraged the tremendous potential of the In-
ternet.8  Now any customer with an Internet connection can access
bank accounts and execute transactions at practically any time and
from any location.9  The customer can use a broadband connection
to the Internet, a dial-up, or a satellite link in some remote place or
aboard a ship.
com/action/article.do?command=ViewArticleBasic&articleId=9013098&source=NLT
_SEC&nlid=38.
4. See, e.g., Peter Coffee, Security:  Next Steps, EWK., Jan. 8, 2007, at 37.
5. See, e.g., Anne Chen, Demo:  Security Rules, EWK., Feb. 21, 2005, at 28; Law
Firm Makes Case for eRoom, EWK., Apr. 2, 2007, at 42 (reporting that DLA Piper
USA uses the Documentum eRoom software to provide secure information sharing
between its 32,000 attorneys in twenty four countries).
6. See, e.g., Cambridge Technology Partners Launches Industry’s First Global In-
ternet Banking Initiative With Security First Technologies, BUS. WIRE, Nov. 20, 1996,
available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0EIN/is_1996_Nov_20/ai_18872833.
7. See, e.g., Martin Michael, The Next Big Thing:  A Bookstore?, FORTUNE, Dec.
9, 1996, at 168-70 (one of the early reports about the Internet startup company Ama-
zon.com, now one of the leading online retailers).
8. See, e.g., Richard L. Field, 1996:  Survey of the Year’s Developments in Elec-
tronic Cash Law and the Laws Affecting Electronic Banking in the United States, 46
AM. U. L. REV. 967, 969 (1997) (pointing out that the financial industry is interested
in leveraging electronic commerce and payment systems to deliver innovative prod-
ucts and services, develop new markets, and lower operational costs); Jerry Jackson,
Check Out Banking Via PC; Home Banking With Personal Computers Is Becoming
Common, but It Pays to Know Which Service Offers the Options You Need, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Oct. 23, 1996, at E1; Martyn Williams, Citibank Japan Launches Internet
Banking Service, NEWSBYTES, Dec. 22, 1998, available at 1998 WLNR 4065946.
9. See, e.g., CitiDirect Online Banking, http://www.citidirect-online.com (last
visited Nov. 17, 2007) (Internet-based corporate banking system offering from
Citigroup).
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Ensuring the security of online transactions, however, is a chal-
lenging task.10  The global nature of the Internet exposes online
businesses to attacks by cybercriminals of all types from all over
the world.11  Financial institutions, merchants, and organizations
storing data that criminals can exploit for illicit financial gains are
among the primary targets.  Therefore, these institutions and actors
must ensure that their computer systems can withstand attacks of
the most sophisticated and skilled intruders, including organized
crime syndicates, terrorist organizations, and foreign government
agencies.12  At the same time, it is critically important for Ameri-
can society to secure online transactions, ensure consumer confi-
dence in conducting business online, and protect Americans from
being victimized at an increasing rate.13
This Comment illustrates how government regulation, criminal
justice, private legal actions, and market forces contribute to the
security of online transactions.  Further, it argues that government
regulation aimed at the prevention of cybercrime should be the pri-
mary focus of the efforts to improve online security.  Part I ex-
plains that malicious hackers are becoming an integral part of
organized crime and terrorist organizations.  Part II provides an
overview of various attack schemes used by cybercriminals.
Part III examines industry efforts intended to prevent cyber-
crimes through technological solutions and raising awareness of in-
formation security issues among business leaders, government
officials, and consumers.  The discussion continues with an over-
view of private legal actions where plaintiffs attempted to hold bus-
iness organizations accountable for failing to secure their personal
and financial information.
10. See, e.g., Michael Singer, Feeling Safe Online, BANK SYSTEMS & TECH., Mar.
2007, at 19 (pointing out technical difficulties in securing online transactions); Sandra
Gittlen, New Attacks Leave Online Transactions Vulnerable Even After Sign-On Au-
thentication, COMPUTERWORLD, Aug. 28, 2007, available at http://www.computer
world.com/action/article.do?command=ViewArticleBasic&articleId=9000174.
11. See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1003, 1071 (2001).
12. K.C. Jones, University Unveils Cyber Threat Calculator, INFO.WK., Jan. 26,
2007, available at http://www.informationweek.com/1122/threat.htm (noting that for-
eign states, especially Russia and China, as well as “individuals, political groups, relig-
ious groups and organized crime groups . . . pose ongoing risks and should be
considered cyber threats”).
13. Sharon Gaudin, ID Theft Is Exploding in the U.S., BANK SYSTEMS & TECH.,
Mar. 7, 2007, available at http://www.banktech.com/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=198
002061 (reporting that fifteen million Americans fell victim to identity theft in the
past twelve months, a fifty percent increase since 2003).
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Part IV addresses the role of the government in improving the
security of online transactions.  In particular, the discussion shows
that many cybercrimes were precipitated by an organization’s fail-
ure to adhere to basic information security principles.  Using finan-
cial institutions as an example, Part IV also shows how government
regulation can force business organizations to maintain adequate
security of their computer systems.
Part V provides a discussion of various approaches to securing
online transactions.  Ultimately, Part V concludes that government
regulation and oversight, the deterrent effect of criminal prosecu-
tion, and the right to enforce through private legal action compli-
ance with government-mandated information security standards
may be the optimal way to improve the security of online transac-
tions and prevent cybercrime.
I. CYBERCRIME:  A GROWING THREAT
A. Hackers as a Part of Organized Crime and Terror Networks
An inherent lack of security in the Internet architecture and rel-
ative user anonymity make the Internet an attractive medium for
extortion14 and crimes involving theft of personal information for
illicit financial gain.15  According to a recent IDG News Service
report, hackers have joined forces with organized criminal groups
to engage in increasingly sophisticated criminal schemes operated
exclusively for profit.16  Although computer crime experts agree
that most computer-related crimes go either undetected or unre-
ported,17 the Internet Crime Complaint Center recently reported
14. See, e.g., United States v. Ivanov, 175 F. Supp. 2d 367 (D. Conn. 2001) (up-
holding an indictment of a Russian hacker on charges of conspiracy, computer fraud,
extortion, and possession of unauthorized access devices for breaking into a financial
transaction processing company’s computer systems and demanding a payment for his
assistance in securing the systems).
15. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Hackers from India Indicted for Online
Brokerage Intrusion Scheme that Victimized Customers and Brokerage Firms (Mar.
12, 2007), http://www.cybercrime.gov/marimuthuIndict.htm.  “A federal grand jury in
Omaha, Neb., has indicted three individuals on charges of conspiracy, fraud and ag-
gravated identity theft stemming from a high-tech, international fraud scheme de-
signed to hijack online brokerage accounts for profit.” Id.
16. Jeremy Kirk & Robert McMillan, 2006:  The Year in Security, IDG NEWS SER-
VICE, Dec. 7, 2006, available at http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?com-
mand=PrintArticleBasic&articleId=9005743 [hereinafter Kirk & McMillan, Year in
Security] (noting that in 2006, financially motivated cybercriminals emerged as public
enemy No. 1).
17. See, e.g., Charney, supra note 2, at 943-44.
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that the total annual amount of losses reported in 2006 was $198
million, compared with $183 million in 2005.18
Financial institutions are among the primary targets of cyber-
criminals.  According to recent reports, organized crime groups
have offered millions of dollars for help in breaking into financial
institutions’ computer networks.19  The FBI has confirmed the exis-
tence of organized crime structures in parts of the hacking commu-
nity, particularly in Eastern Europe, that function as criminal
enterprises.20  In such instances, hackers break into computer sys-
tems and steal data, while other individuals sell the data for profit
to those who exploit the stolen data in order to gain unauthorized
access to credit card, bank, and brokerage accounts of unsuspecting
victims.21  According to industry observers, the market for stolen
identities has recently reached one billion dollars.22
The most alarming development in the area of information sys-
tems security is that terrorist organizations now perceive cyber-
crimes both as a source of financing for their activities23 and as a
new weapon in their arsenal.24  For example, according to law en-
forcement organizations, the Irish Republican Army and the ter-
rorists that plotted the foiled bombing of the Los Angeles
18. NATIONAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME CENTER & FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTI-
GATION, INTERNET FRAUD CRIME REPORT 3 (2006), http://www.ic3.gov/media/annual
report/2006_IC3Report.pdf.  IC3 is a clearing house for all kinds of cybercrime com-
plaints designed to track the prevalence of Internet fraud in the U.S. and run by the
FBI in partnership with the National White Collar Crime Center.  IC3 started opera-
tion on May 8, 2000. Id. at 4.
19. Larry Greenemeier, A Researcher Passes on the Big Leagues, INFO. WK., Feb.
12, 2007, at 36 (reporting that a computer security researcher declined an offer from a
criminal group that offered to pay him $2.8 million for each financial services com-
pany he helped to infiltrate).
20. Larry Greenemeier & J. Nicholas Hoover, The Hacker Economy, INFO. WK.,
Feb. 12, 2007, at 32 [hereinafter Greenemeier & Hoover, Hacker Economy].
21. Id.
22. Id. at 38.
23. See, e.g., Todd M. Hinnen, The Cyber-Front in the War on Terrorism:  Curbing
Terrorist Use of the Internet, 5 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 5, 9 (2004) (noting that
terrorists perpetrate online crimes to support their missions).  Terrorists use the In-
ternet to raise funds, as a means of communication, for the propaganda of their ideas,
and for recruiting new members.  Terrorists also plan to use the Internet to attack
critical elements on the national infrastructure. Id. at 5.
24. See, e.g., Jeremy Kirk, Russian Expert:  Terrorists May Try Cyberattacks, IDG
NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 13, 2006, available at http://www.computerworld.com/action/arti-
cle.do?command=ViewArticleBasic&articleId=9006003; Robert Lazner & Nathan
Vardi, The Next Threat, FORBES, Sept. 20, 2004, at 70 (discussing the vulnerability of
the United States economy to terrorist cyberattacks); Tom Zeller Jr., On the Open
Internet, a Web of Dark Alleys, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2004 at C1 (warning about the
danger of cyberterrorism).
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International Airport used identity theft to finance their activi-
ties.25  Imam Samudra, the radical Muslim cleric and mastermind
of the devastating 2002 Bali bombing attacks that claimed 202 lives,
called for fellow Muslim radicals to take jihad into cyberspace and
tap into online credit card fraud as a source of funding.26
Although some individuals still break into computer systems for
fun, bragging rights, or as a prank, they do not pose nearly as much
of a threat to the security of online transactions as highly moti-
vated, increasingly sophisticated, well-organized, and well-funded
groups of cybercriminals and cyberterrorists.27
B. Hacker Tools for Sale
Contrary to popular belief, most of the attacks perpetrated
against computer systems do not require a high level of technical
sophistication.28  Many hacking tools, as well as legitimate com-
puter programs that cybercriminals use for malicious purposes are
freely available for download on the Internet,29 while more sophis-
ticated tools are offered for sale.30  According to a recent study by
IBM, attacks will likely increase in 2007 because cybercriminals or-
ganize networks dedicated to the production and commercial dis-
tribution of increasingly sophisticated malicious software
(“malware”) that is later used in criminal attacks on computer sys-
tems.31  Additionally, Raimund Genes, the chief technical officer
(“CTO”) of Trend Micro, a security software vendor, contends that
25. Timothy L. O’Brien, Gone in 60 Seconds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2004, at § 3-1.
26. Alan Spires, An Indonesian’s Prison Memoir Takes Holy War into Cyberspace;
In Sign of New Threat, Militant Offer Tips on Credit Card Fraud, WASH. POST, Dec.
14, 2004, at A19.
27. See, e.g., Robert McMillan, Two Charged with Hacking LA Traffic Lights, IDG
NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 10, 2007, available at http://www.computerworld.com/action/arti-
cle.do?command=ViewArticleBasic&articleId=9007751 (reporting that two individu-
als were charged with illegal computer access for allegedly hacking into the Los
Angeles traffic control center and turning off traffic lights at four intersections in
August 2006).
28. See, e.g., Stephen E. Henderson & Matthew E. Yarbrough, Frontiers of Law:
The Internet and Cyberspace:  Suing the Insecure?:  A Duty of Care in Cyberspace, 32
N.M. L. REV. 11, 11-12 (2002) (noting that a fifteen year-old teenager from Montreal
was responsible for crippling several major internet sites in 2000 by launching attacks
against them).
29. See id. at 12.
30. See, e.g., Greenemeier & Hoover, Hacker Economy, supra note 20, at 32 (not-
ing that malicious software, or malware, such as keyloggers, worms, and viruses, has
become a valuable commodity in the hacker economy).
31. Paul McDougall, Organized Malware Factories Threaten Internet Users, Study
Says, INFO.WK., Jan. 30, 2007, available at http://www.informationweek.com/shared/
printableArticle.jhtml?articleID=197001739.
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the revenue generated by the malware industry exceeded the
twenty-six billion dollars earned by legitimate computer security
vendors in 2005.32
The industrial production of malware will make it much more
difficult for IT professionals to stay ahead of hackers in securing
computer systems.33  Gunter Ollmann, the director of security
strategy at IBM’s Security Systems unit, warned that the criminal
malware infrastructure allows cybercriminals to target their attacks
and build custom malware to be used against specific organiza-
tions.34  This development increases the risk for high-value targets,
such as financial institutions, payment processing companies, and
big retailers.35
“Zero-day exploits” take advantage of newly discovered security
vulnerabilities before software vendors issue patches for their af-
fected products and, therefore, are especially valuable for cyber-
criminals.36  In 2006, cybercriminals unleashed zero-day attacks on
an unprecedented scale, raising serious concerns in the software
development and IT industry.37  But since it is legal to post infor-
mation on the Internet about unpatched security vulnerabilities in
commercial software products, law enforcement can do little to
prevent the creation of code, which exploits these vulnerabilities.38
The next Section provides a brief overview of attack schemes
that cybercriminals use to cripple computer systems and gain unau-
thorized access to information that may enable them to execute
fraudulent transactions.
II. INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY AND CYBERATTACKS
The primary goals of information system security professionals
are to ensure the availability of computer systems and the data
stored in them for authorized users, as well as to protect the integ-
32. See, e.g., Greenemeier & Hoover, Hacker Economy, supra note 20, at 36.
33. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 10, at 19 (pointing out that cybercriminals are
often better equipped than information security professionals).
34. McDougall, supra note 31.
35. Jaikumar Vijayan, Targeted Attacks Pose New Security Challenge, COM-
PUTERWORLD, June 27, 2005, available at http://www.computerworld.com/securitytop-
ics/security/story/0,10801,102779,00.html (reporting a massive credit card security
breach caused by a targeted attack and pointing out that stopping such attacks is
extremely difficult).
36. See, e.g., Greenemeier & Hoover, Hacker Economy, supra note 20, at 36 (re-
porting that last year, zero-day exploits were selling for twenty to thirty thousand
dollars each).
37. See Kirk & McMillan, Year in Security, supra note 16.
38. See Greenemeier & Hoover, Hacker Economy, supra note 20, at 36.
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rity and confidentiality of the data.39  Any attack against a com-
puter system affects at least one of these three major components
of information security.40
A. Denial-of-service Attacks
Denial-of-service (“DoS”) attacks are primarily aimed at dis-
rupting the availability of computer system resources to authorized
users, usually, by sending invalid data that causes the server
software to crash or by flooding computer systems with invalid re-
quests.41  The increasing number of unsolicited junk e-mails,
known as spam, can also cause a DoS by decreasing or denying
availability of e-mail services to authorized users and by clogging
their mailboxes with unwanted e-mails, thus interfering with the
user’s ability to send and receive legitimate e-mail messages.42  To
launch distributed denial-of-service (“DDoS”) attacks, cyber-
criminals, using malware installed on hundreds or even thousands
of compromised computer systems, attempt to flood the victim’s
network with requests and disrupt access to the target Web site or
to overload the victim’s servers and cause them to crash.43
Even more dangerous is a distributed reflective denial-of-service
(“DRDoS”) attack, where the attacker uses compromised com-
puters to send connection requests to many other computers on the
Internet specifying the victim as the originator of the requests.44
This causes the computers receiving the requests to send replies to
the victim’s computer multiple times causing the victim’s network
to be clogged with their replies.45
39. SUSAN HANSCHE ET AL., OFFICIAL GUIDE TO THE CISSP EXAM 3-8 (2004).
The Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP) certification offered
by the International Information Systems Security Certification Consortium is a well-
respected industry certification credential for information security professionals. See
International Information Systems Security Certification Consortium, CISSP – The
International Gold Standard, www.isc2.org/cgi-bin/content.cgi?category=97 (last vis-
ited Nov. 17, 2007).
40. HANSCHE, supra note 39, at 3-8.
41. Id. at 155.  Although DOS can result from natural and man-made disasters,
such as hurricanes, earthquakes, blackouts, software glitches, or explosions, this Sec-
tion is concerned with intentional disruption of computer systems’ availability by ma-
licious hackers.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 155-56.
44. For more information on DRDoS, see Steve Gibson, DRDoS (2002), http://
www.grc.com/dos/drdos.htm.  The technique of replacing the originator’s address in
network data packets or e-mails sent over the Internet is called spoofing. Id.
45. Id.  Multiple replies result from the design of Internet protocols.  If the sender
does not receive an acknowledgment that a packet of data sent reached its destina-
tion, the sender will retry several times before giving up.  Perpetrators of DRDoS
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DDoS attacks are not a kids’ game anymore; they have become
a weapon of choice for cyber-extortionists and unscrupulous busi-
nesspeople attempting to bring down competitors’ Web sites.46
The DDoS, and especially DRDoS, attacks are very difficult to in-
vestigate because of the difficulty in tracing them back to the at-
tackers.47  Nevertheless, in Los Angeles in 2004, the FBI executed
the first arrests related to a large-scale DDoS attack used for com-
mercial purposes in which two businessmen hired a team of hack-
ers to bring down competitors’ Web sites.48
B. Spam
In 2004, Microsoft founder and chief software architect Bill
Gates predicted that spam would be gone by 2006.49  Despite his
prophecy, spam comprised up to ninety percent of all e-mails in
2006.50
IT administrators are constantly struggling to protect their e-
mail servers from an ever increasing volume of spam.51  To bypass
e-mail filters, spammers started using images instead of text in their
e-mails.52  To avoid detection, spammers often use compromised
computers and unprotected wireless networks to send millions of
junk e-mail messages.53  Although modern anti-spam systems usu-
ally filter out around ninety-eight percent of spam e-mails, spam-
attacks exploit this protocol design feature for a dual purpose, as an attack amplifier
and as an additional layer of stealth. Id.
46. See, e.g., FBI Press Release, supra note 1; see also Timothy L. O’Brien, The
Rise of Digital Thugs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2005 at § 3-1.
47. See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 44.
48. See FBI Press Release, supra note 1; see also Federal Bureau of Investigation,
The Case Of The Hired Hacker:  Entrepreneur and Hacker Arrested for Online Sabo-
tage (2005), http://www.fbi.gov/page2/april05/hiredhacker041805.htm.
49. Kirk & McMillan, Year in Security, supra note 16.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Dan Kaplan, New Flood of Spam, SC MAG., Mar. 2007, at 16 (report-
ing a 100% increase in spam volume in October 2006 compared to October 2005 and
linking the growth to the increased use of image spam).
52. Id.  See also Robert McMillan, “Rock Phish” Blamed for Surge in Attacks,
IDG NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 12, 2006, available at http://www.computerworld.com/ac-
tion/article.do?command=ViewArticleBasic&articleId=9005958&pageNumber=1
[hereinafter McMillan, Rock Phish] (reporting increased use of image spam that is
much more difficult to identify and intercept); SYMANTEC CORPORATION, SYMANTEC
MESSAGING AND WEB SECURITY, A MONTHLY REPORT – FEBRUARY 2007 (2007),
http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/Symantec_Spam_Report_-_February_
2007.pdf  (reporting increase in image spam).
53. FBI Press Release, supra note 1 (reporting that a spammer was charged under
the CAN SPAM Act, Pub. L. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699, for using open and unencrypted
wireless networks to send bulk e-mails advertising pornographic Web sites).
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mers ensure that a large number of their e-mails still reach users’
mailboxes by employing automated spam engines to send out a
huge volume of e-mails.54
Cybercriminals often use spam e-mails in various fraud and iden-
tity theft schemes to gain unauthorized access to financial accounts
or for large-scale deployment of various types of malware.55
C. Phishing
As financial institutions and online merchants make their Web
sites more secure, cybercriminals more often resort to relatively
low-tech attacks, such as phishing.56  “Phishing” refers to criminals’
creation of e-mails and Web sites, designed to look like e-mails and
Web sites of well-respected legitimate businesses, financial institu-
tions, and government agencies—in order to trick Internet users
into disclosing their financial account or other sensitive personal
information57
Although software vendors add anti-phishing features to their
products, cybercriminals change their tactics to stay ahead of the
game.58  More sophisticated phishing attacks may attempt to ex-
ploit vulnerabilities in a financial institution’s or online payment
services company’s Web site in order to redirect the victim’s
browser to a malicious Web site while maintaining the appearance
that the victim is still connected to a legitimate Web site.59  Other
phishing attacks may involve the use of deception to install
spyware on victims’ machines in order to steal sensitive personal
information.60  Attackers also started using unique URL’s for each
phishing e-mail they send to make it more difficult to identify and
54. Jeremy Kirk, Spam Fight Escalates, COMPUTERWORLD, Oct. 2, 2006, available
at http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=ViewArticleBasic&ar-
ticleId=266043 [hereinafter Kirk, Spam Fight] (pointing out that attempts to filter out
more than 98% of spam will result in some legitimate e-mail messages being filtered
out as well).
55. See infra Part II.C-E for a detailed discussion.
56. See McMillan, Rock Phish, supra note 52 (reporting that a highly sophisticated R
group of cybercriminals known as “Rock Phish” targets European and U.S. financial
institutions, such as Citibank, ETrade, Barclays, and Deutsche Bank).
57. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT ON “PHISHING” (2004), http://www.
usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/docs/Phishing.pdf.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Wikipedia, Cross-Site Scripting, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-
site_scripting.  This type of attack is called cross-site scripting. Id.
60. Greenemeier & Hoover, Hacker Economy, supra note 20, at 36-37.
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block the attack.61  “Spear phishing” is another type of phishing
attack where attackers target a specific group of Internet users, for
example employees of a particular financial institution, in an at-
tempt to steal their access credentials.62  Criminals often use auto-
mated phishing tools, spam engines, and botnets in their phishing
attacks.63
Despite extensive efforts by software vendors to improve the se-
curity of their products, phishing is still a serious threat to the se-
curity of online transactions.64  Victims of phishing attacks suffer
financial losses, and must spend time and money rebuilding their
credit and good name.
D. Zombies and Botnets
Compromised computers with installed malware remotely con-
trolled by cybercriminals are usually referred to as zombies.65  A
botnet is a group of zombies controlled by a particular hacker or
criminal group.66  The owners of zombie computers are not usually
aware that their computers have become part of an illicit network
and a tool in the hands of cybercriminals.67
Botnets have become a very important and extremely dangerous
weapon in the cybercriminals’ arsenal because of their concen-
trated power, which criminals can use to perpetrate various mali-
cious acts on the Internet.68  Botnet attacks are growing in number,
61. McMillan, Rock Phish, supra note 52.  This technique allows attackers to avoid
protective features in Web browsers and other software based upon blacklisting
URLs that belong to known phishing Web sites. Id.
62. See, e.g., Timothy L. O’Brien, Gone Spear Phishin’ For a New Breed of Hack-
ers, This Time It’s Personal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2005 at § 3-1;  Ellen Messmer, Fish
for New Employees and Get Phished?, NETWORK WORLD, Mar. 13, 2007, available at
http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=ViewArticleBasic&arti-
cleId=9012978 (reporting phishing attacks targeting company employees).
63. Id. See infra Part II.D for a discussion of botnets.
64. Robert McMillan, Microsoft Sees Botnets as Top ‘07 Net Threat, IDG NEWS
SERVICE, Dec. 27, 2006, available at http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?
command=PrintArticleBasic&articleId=9006818 [hereinafter McMillan, Botnets Top
‘07 Threat].  According to Aron Kornblum, a senior attorney with Microsoft’s In-
ternet Safety Enforcement team, Microsoft continues to see phishing as a “serious
threat.” Id.
65. Stephen Labaton, An Army of Soulless 1’s and 0’s, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2005,
at C1 (warning about the growing danger of zombies).
66. See, e.g., Evan Ratliff, The Zombie Hunters, NEW YORKER, Oct. 10, 2005, at
44.
67. Labaton, supra note 65, at C1.
68. Id.  According to Christopher Painter from the U.S. Department of Justice’s
computer crime and intellectual property section, botnets have become “the Swiss
Army knife of computer hacking.” Update, SC MAG., Apr. 2007, at 14.
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sophistication, and power.69  Microsoft considers botnets to be the
top Internet threat of 2007.70
To deploy botnet software, hackers typically use automated tools
that exploit known security vulnerabilities in popular software
products and the complacency of users who fail to install the latest
security updates or who visit unsafe Web sites infected by
malware.71  For example, a hacker’s robot can scan the Internet in
a predefined address range probing each computer it finds for
known vulnerabilities, weak passwords susceptible to guessing, or
for backdoors opened by malware already present on the com-
puter.72  Once the robot succeeds in gaining control over vulnera-
ble computers, it will install malware that the robot owners will
later use to steal information; for spam and DDoS attacks; or to
temporarily store illegal, malicious, or stolen files.73
Hackers often deceive users into downloading software to their
computers as a part of a seemingly innocent software package, such
as a screen saver, game, or some utility program.74  Sometimes
hackers attempt to lure unsuspecting users to visit Web sites that
will attempt to install malware on their machines by exploiting
Web browser vulnerabilities or inadequate security settings.75
Since Internet users have become more cautious, hackers have
started using compromised legitimate Web sites for the dissemina-
tion of malware.76
69. Thomas Claburn et al., Beware the Bots, INFO.WK., Oct. 9, 2006, at 48.
70. McMillan, Botnets Top ‘07 Threat, supra note 64.
71. See, e.g., Greenemeier, Buzz on New Bots, supra note 3, at 44.
72. Id.
73. Id.; see also Claburn et al., supra note 69, at 44.  There are products, usually
implemented as software or a combination of software and hardware components,
known as firewalls, that among other functions, can make computer systems “invisi-
ble” to other computers on the Internet.  This, of course, does not apply to publicly
available Web sites that by design should be accessible to all Internet users.  There,
firewalls protect computer systems from attacks by blocking unwanted and malicious
requests according to pre-defined algorithms. See generally Thomas DeFelice, De-
signing and Implementing Firewalls, DATA COMMUNICATIONS MANAGEMENT, June
2002.
74. Malware using this delivery mechanism is also known as a Trojan horse or
Trojan. See HANSCHE, supra note 39, at 162. R
75. See Roger A. Grimes, Ever-Evolving Malware is Getting Nastier, INFOWORLD,
June 1, 2007, http://www.infoworld.com/article/07/06/01/22OPsecadvise_1.html (warn-
ing about the rising danger of Web site-based malware).
76. See Gregg Keizer, Bank of India Site Hacked, Serves up 22 Exploits, COM-
PUTERWORLD, Aug. 31, 2007, available at http://www.computerworld.com/action/arti-
cle.do?command=ViewArticleBasic&articleId=9033999&intsrc=hm_list (reporting
that a Russian gang of cybercriminals is suspected of breaking into the Bank of India
web site and using it to install malware on computers of Internet users that visited the
web site).
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To deploy malicious code, cybercriminals often use extensive
spam campaigns77 utilizing automated spam engines that leverage
the tremendous computing power of botnets to send millions of e-
mails within a very short period of time making it practically im-
possible to trace those spam e-mails back to their true origina-
tors.78  Botnets also enable cybercriminals to perform with ease
other operations that require tremendous computing power, such
as generating unique images for millions of spam e-mails in order
to avoid spam filters or breaking encryption and recovering
messages, passwords, or data.79  This computing power poses a very
serious threat to the security of online transactions that rely on en-
cryption for ensuring integrity and confidentiality.
E. Mobile Technology:  New Frontiers for Financial
Institutions and Cybercriminals
In an attempt to increase their customer base and reduce costs,
financial institutions constantly look for new delivery channels for
their services.80  As customers demand faster, more convenient ser-
vices, financial institutions turn to new technologies to expand
their customer relationships to compete with other financial ser-
vices providers.81
Many financial institutions view mobile technology as one of the
ways to expand their services in an increasingly mobile society.82
Several banks announced pilot projects to explore the viability of
mobile banking and assess customer interest in this new delivery
channel.83  For example, Bank of America launched a service al-
lowing its customers to transfer money and pay bills on mobile de-
77. Labaton, supra note 65, at C1 (reporting on a spam campaign launched by
unknown cybercriminals where instead of promised revealing pictures of Jennifer Lo-
pez users downloaded malware onto their computers after clicking on a link provided
in the e-mail).
78. See Claburn et al., supra note 69, at 48.
79. See id.  Cryptanalysis is the science of breaking encryption schemes. See, e.g.,
Bruce Schneier, Self-Study Course in Block Cipher Cryptanalysis, 24 CRYPTOLOGIA
18, 18-33 (2000).
80. Maria Bruno-Britz, Mobilizing Retail Payments, BANK SYS. & TECH., Apr.
2007, at 35-36.
81. See id.
82. Jane J. Kim, Mobile Banking Shifts Into Higher Gear, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21,
2007, at D1.
83. See Bruno-Britz, supra note 80, at 36. R
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vices while Citibank announced an intent to pilot a real-time
person-to-person mobile payment service.84
At the same time, the rapid growth of wireless and mobile tech-
nologies that are much more difficult to secure than their wired
counterparts raises serious security concerns among IT profession-
als and Internet users.85  Many consumers doubt the security of
mobile banking.86  Recent research shows that security concerns in
the United States will likely delay the adoption of mobile bank-
ing.87  Some industry insiders suggest that mobile banking in the
United States is still at least five years away.88
There are good reasons for these security concerns.  The growing
popularity of mobile devices and Internet-enabled cell-phones
makes them appealing targets for virus writers, bot creators, and
malicious hackers.89  As mobile devices become more technologi-
cally sophisticated and widespread, mobile malware becomes more
prevalent and dangerous.90  Experts predict sharp increases in at-
tacks against mobile devices as more financial institutions roll out
mobile banking initiatives.91  While some types of malware creators
concentrate their attention exclusively on mobile devices, others
attempt to use mobile devices, more vulnerable than conventional
computers, as entry points for the penetration of corporate net-
84. Id.; see also Press Release, Citigroup Inc., Citi & Obopay to Pilot Innovative
Mobile Person-to-Person Payment Service (Feb. 28, 2007), http://www.citigroup.com/
citigroup/press/2007/070228a.htm).
85. See, e.g., Dan Nystedt, Wireless Growth in Asia Leads to Security Woes, IDG
NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 13, 2006, available at http://www.computerworld.com/action/arti-
cle/do?command=ViewArticleBasic&articleID=9005978&source=rss_news50.
86. Nancy Feig, Everyone’s Ready for Mobile Banking, Except Consumers, BANK
SYS. & TECH., Mar. 16, 2007, available at http://www.banktech.com/blog/archives/
2007/03/everyones_ready.html.
87. See Bruno-Britz, supra note 80, at 36. R
88. See id.
89. See, e.g., Greenemeier, Buzz on New Bots, supra note 3, at 44.
90. Jeremy Kirk, Security Vendor Detects Aggressive Mobile Worm Variant, IDG
NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 4, 2006, available at http://www.computerworld.com/action/arti-
cle.do?command=ViewArticleBasic&articleId=9002213 (reporting that a “security
vendor has detected a new variant of an aggressive Russian mobile worm that uses
some alarming new tricks”).
91. John Blau, Experts:  2007 Bodes Ill for Mobile Banking, IDG NEWS SERVICE,
Jan. 22, 2007, available at http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command
=ViewArticleBasic&articleId=9008788&source=NLT_SEC&nlid=38.
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works.92  The more connected our society becomes, the more op-
portunities there are for cybercriminals to launch their attacks.93
The growing sophistication of cybercriminals raised serious con-
cerns in the software industry and among companies conducting
business online and led to extensive efforts to improve online se-
curity.  Businesses and individuals that sustained losses from crimi-
nal attacks perpetrated over the Internet filed legal actions against
companies whose failure to ensure adequate security of their com-
puter systems precipitated the attacks.  The next Section explores
these issues in more detail.
III. INDUSTRY RESPONSE AND PRIVATE LEGAL ACTIONS
UNDER STATE LAW
Rising losses from cybercrimes have prompted a wide spectrum
of industry responses.  Software companies have added new secur-
ity features to their products, patched newly discovered vulnerabil-
ities, and helped law enforcement agencies to investigate Internet
crimes.  Security vendors and Internet service providers (“ISPs”)
now offer new products and services aimed at improving security
of online transactions.  Financial services companies are continuing
their efforts to raise awareness of cybercrimes and online security.
Businesses and consumers are bringing legal actions in an attempt
to recover their losses.
A. Industry Fights Back
Industry concerns about Internet threats and consumer confi-
dence in conducting business online have led to efforts directed at
improving security through technological innovation, development
of new security standards,94 and raising awareness of security issues
among business leaders and consumers.95
92. Cara Garretson, Mobile Devices Expose Networks to Security Threats, NET-
WORK WORLD, Feb. 23, 2007, available at http://www.computerworld.com/action/arti-
cle.do?command=ViewArticleBasic&taxonomyName=crm&articleId=9011680&
taxonomyId=120&intsrc=kc_feat.
93. See Greenemeier, Buzz on New Bots, supra note 3, at 44.
94. See, e.g., James F. Bauerle, SPeRS Revisited:  Establishing Standards to Assure
Enforceable Electronic Financial Transactions, 122 BANKING L.J. 1033, (2005); PCI
Security Standards Council, Payment Cards Industry Data Security Standard (Sept.
2006), https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/pdfs/pci_dss_v1-1.pdf; Darryl K. Taft,
OASIS Approves New Web Services Security Standards, EWEEK.COM, Mar. 27, 2007,
available at http://www.eweek.com/print_article2/0,1217,a=204078,00.asp.
95. See, e.g., Claburn et al., supra note 69, at 50.
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IT managers in many companies are more cautious now when it
comes to protecting their computer systems.96  Organizations mon-
itor their employees’ use of computer resources to detect abuse
and fraud.97  To handle information security breaches, organiza-
tions create incident response teams that include not only IT pro-
fessionals, but also legal counsel to provide guidance and ensure
compliance with applicable laws and regulations.98
ISPs have expanded their services to help customers protect
their computers from spam, malware, phishing attacks, worms, and
viruses.99  Security vendors have developed new software and hard-
ware products and expanded their services to protect networks
from criminal attacks.100  To help individual Internet users keep
their computers safe, some security vendors provide free basic ver-
sions of their products for personal use,101 while software vendors
provide free security updates for their products and free malware
removal tools.102
In an attempt to improve the security of their products and to
fight cybercrime, software vendors have joined forces with law en-
forcement agencies.  For example, Microsoft worked with the Na-
tional Security Agency in securing the Windows operating
systems.103  Microsoft’s Internet Safety Enforcement team, now a
sixty-five person operation, worked on cases involving worms, vi-
96. See, e.g., Mathias Thurman, Putting the Brakes on Net Integration, COM-
PUTERWORLD, Nov. 27, 2006, available at http://www.computerworld.com/action/arti-
cle.do?command=ViewArticleBasic&articleId=274042 (an IT manager reporting how
cautiously his company proceeded on integrating its computer system after an
acquisition).
97. C.J. Kelly, Looking Into What We Can Look Into, COMPUTERWORLD, Mar. 5,
2007, available at http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=Print
ArticleBasic&articleId=283640.
98. See, e.g., Kevin Mandia, Dissecting the Damage of Hackers, LEGAL TIMES, Jan.
29, 2007, at 31.
99. See, e.g., Jim Duffy, Verizon Business Goes Phishing with New Service, NET-
WORK WORLD, Mar. 7, 2007, available at http://www.computerworld.com/action/arti-
cle.do?command=ViewArticleBasic&articleId=9012500.
100. See, e.g., Claburn et al., surpra note 69, at 50 (discussing new information sys-
tems security services and appliances); Kirk, Spam Fight, supra note 54 (reporting on
the latest developments in the arms race between security vendors and spammers).
101. See, e.g., Check Point Software Technologies Ltd., Welcome to ZoneAlarm
Downloads, http://www.zonealarm.com/store/content/company/products/znalm/free
Download1.jsp (last visited Nov. 17, 2007).
102. See, e.g., Microsoft, Windows Update, http://windowsupdate.microsoft.com
(last visited Nov. 17, 2007); Microsoft, Malicious Software Removal Tool, http://www.
microsoft.com/security/malwareremove/default.mspx (last visited Nov. 17, 2007).
103. Robert McMillan, NSA Helped Microsoft Set Security for Vista, COM-
PUTERWORLD, Jan. 15, 2007, available at http://www.computerworld.com/action/arti-
cle.do?command=PrintArticleBasic&articleId=279002.
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ruses, child pornography, typosquatting,104 botnets, and helped law
enforcement track down international cybercriminals.105
Pressured by the financial industry and online payment service
providers, software vendors have added anti-phishing features to
their products.106  In order to encourage customers to use their on-
line services, financial institutions are working hard to maintain the
security of their Web sites while attempting to educate their cus-
tomers about phishing and other Internet-related scams.107  RSA
Security, a security software vendor, is planning to extend its phish-
ing Web site take-down service to help financial institutions and
online merchants detect dangerous Trojans108 that steal customer
financial information.  The software will remove the Trojans and
shut down the associated Web sites.109
The weakest links in the United States payment system continue
to be businesses that accept credit and debit card payments and the
consumers themselves.110  To address these issues, the payment
card industry requires merchants to comply with stringent informa-
tion security standards.111  The enforcement of these standards,
however, is not always adequate.  For example, the security breach
at the TJX Companies, Inc. (“TJX”)112 last year that compromised
the credit card information of millions of customers resulted from
the merchant storing credit card data in violation of the Visa Oper-
ating Regulations113 and Payment Cards Industry Data Security
104. Typosquatting is a technique that relies on typographical errors made by In-
ternet users when inputting a Web site address into a Web browser to lead users to a
Web site owned by a typosquatter. See Wikipedia, Typosquatting, http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Typosquatting (last visited Nov. 17, 2007).
105. See McMillan, Botnets Top ‘07 Threat, supra note 64 (reporting that Microsoft
helped law enforcement agencies to track down a cybercriminal gang that operated
from Bulgaria).
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Citigroup, Learn About Spoofs, http://www.citibank.com/domain/
spoof/learn.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2007).
108. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. R
109. Robert McMillan, RSA to Offer Trojan Take-Down Service, IDG NEWS SER-
VICE, Mar. 15, 2007, available at http://www.infoworld.com/article/07/03/15/HNrsa-
trojantakedown_1.html.
110. See, e.g., Richardson v. DSW, Inc., No. 05 C 4599, 2005 WL 2978755 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 3, 2005) (customers sued a merchant for damages sustained as a result of a credit
card information theft from the merchant’s computer system); ID Theft Is Exploding
in the U.S., BANK SYS. & TECH., Mar. 7, 2007, http://www.banktech.com/showArticle.
jhtml?articleID=198002061.
111. See, e.g., Visa, Cardholder Information Security Program, http://usa.visa.com/
merchants/risk_management/cisp_merchants.html (last visited Nov. 17,  2007).
112. See The TJX Companies, Inc., http://www.tjx.com (last visited Nov. 17, 2007).
113. See, e.g., Greenemeier & Hoover, Hacker Economy, supra note 20, at 32.  Visa
Operating Regulations do not permit merchants to store or retain credit or debit card
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Standard.114  To prevent such incidents, IBM and Microsoft are
working on technological solutions aimed at securing online
purchases of goods and services.115
Visa, the world’s leading credit card payment company, regularly
brings together leaders and decision makers from business, govern-
ment, and technology organizations to discuss security of electronic
payments.116  To help the private sector and government agencies
ensure that their information security staff has an up-to-date
knowledge of the best industry practices and procedures, several
not-for-profit organizations are offering a number of information
security certifications and educational resources.117
The next Section discusses the role of industry-wide information
security standards and looks at the attempts of private parties to
hold businesses that failed to comply with the standards accounta-
ble for the resulting losses.
B. Industry Information Security Standards and Private Legal
Actions Under State Law
In some instances, financial institutions and private individuals
bring legal actions under state law to recover damages from
merchants and banks that failed to protect customer data stored in
their computer systems from unauthorized access and fraudulent
use by cybercriminals.  Plaintiffs, however, are unlikely to succeed
unless they can show damage suffered as a direct consequence of
the defendants’ failure to protect the data.
For example, in Banknorth, N.A. v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc.,
Banknorth, a financial institution, sued the merchant, B.J.’s Whole-
sale Club (“B.J.’s”), and Fifth Third Bank, B.J.’s acquiring bank,
which processed debit card payments on B.J.’s behalf, for breach of
numbers. See also Banknorth, N.A. v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 2d 283,
284 (D. Me. 2005).
114. PCI SECURITY STANDARDS COUNCIL, PAYMENT CARDS INDUSTRY DATA SE-
CURITY STANDARD (2006), http://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/pdfs/pci_dss_v1-1.pdf.
115. See Brian Prince, IBM Shields Online Personal Data, EWK., Feb. 5, 2007, at 27
(reporting that IBM is working on a new software product that will allow customers
to purchase items without revealing their identity).
116. See Matt Hines, Visa Summit Gathers Players in E-Payments Industry, IN-
FOWORLD, Mar. 7, 2007, available at http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.
do?command=ViewArticleBasic&articleId=9012490.
117. See, e.g., International Information Systems Security Certification Consortium,
(ISC)  Credential Examinations,  http://www.isc2.org/cgi-bin/content.cgi?category=
700 (last visited Nov. 17, 2007); ISACA, CISA (Certified Information Systems Audi-
tor), CISM (Certified Information Security Manager), http://www.isaca.org/certifica-
tion (last visited Nov. 17, 2007).
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contract and negligence to recover losses suffered by Banknorth
when criminals stole their customers’ debit card information stored
in B.J.’s computers.118  The defendants retained customer debit
card information in violation of the Visa Operating Regulations
and failed to protect it from theft.119  Banknorth also brought an
equitable subrogation claim alleging that since it reimbursed its
cardholders for the fraudulent purchases that resulted from de-
fendants’ negligence, it should recover from the defendants in
place of the cardholders.120  The defendants moved to dismiss
Banknorth’s complaint.121  The court found that each claim in-
volved a factual dispute beyond the scope of the motion to dismiss
and denied the plaintiff’s motion.122
Later, however, on the defendants’ motion, the case was trans-
ferred to the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania where two other cases arising from similar circum-
stances were already pending.123  The district court granted the de-
fendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.124
The court held that Banknorth’s contract claim failed because it
was not a third-party beneficiary of the contracts between the de-
fendants, B.J.’s and Fifth Third Bank, or between B.J.’s and Visa
U.S.A.125  The court also held that the economic loss rule barred
Banknorth’s negligence claim because Banknorth did not allege
any damages and only sought to recover for its economic losses.126
Banknorth’s equitable subrogation claim also failed because the
court found that Banknorth paid its customers on its own obliga-
tion and not on its customers’ obligation from B.J.’s.127  The court
also dismissed all complaints in the other two cases against B.J.’s
and Fifth Third Bank on similar grounds holding that there was no
legal basis for the relief sought by the plaintiff.128
118. 394 F. Supp. 2d at 284-85.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 287.
121. Id. at 284.
122. Id. at 285-88.
123. Banknorth, N.A. v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 2d 206, 207-08,
210-16 (M.D. Pa. 2006).  The two other pending cases were Sovereign Bank v. BJ’s
Wholesale Club, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 2d 183 (M.D. Pa. 2005) and Pa. State Employees
Credit Union v. Fifth Third Bank, 398 F. Supp. 2d 317 (M.D. Pa. 2005). Id.
124. Banknorth, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 208.
125. Id. at 210-11.
126. Id. at 211-14.
127. Id. at 214-16.
128. See Pa. State Employees Credit Union v. Fifth Third Bank, Civil No. 1:CV-04-
1554, 2006 WL 1724574 (M.D. Pa. June 16, 2006) (dismissing the claim against the
bank); Sovereign Bank v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., Civil No. 1:CV-05-1150, 2006 WL
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The attempts of individual plaintiffs to institute class action suits
against merchants who failed to protect customers’ credit card in-
formation have not had much success either.  In Richardson v.
DSW, Inc.,129 and Hendricks v. DSW Shoe Warehouse, Inc.,130 cus-
tomers attempted to institute class actions against a shoe retailer
who failed to protect customers’ personal information stored in its
computer systems from theft.  The customers sought a reimburse-
ment of credit monitoring service fees incurred attempting to pro-
tect themselves from identity theft after learning about the security
breach.131  The Richardson court, however, rejected all of the plain-
tiff’s recovery theories except for her implied contract claim,132
while the Hendricks court dismissed the whole complaint, distin-
guishing Richardson v. DSW, Inc. and holding that the plaintiff
failed to allege cognizable damages.133
From the perspective of these cases, it is unlikely that attempts
to hold businesses accountable for information security breaches
under state law will have a noticeable effect on improving security
of online transactions.  As the cases discussed in this Section illus-
trate, although the existence of industry standards, such as the Visa
Operating Regulations, provide some reassurance to the consum-
ers, they do not guarantee adequate information security since the
enforcement of such standards is not uniform.  Moreover, plaintiffs
who suffer losses as a result of noncompliance with the standards
are often unable to hold the parties responsible for the breach ac-
countable.  The next two Sections discuss the role of the federal
government in improving online security.
IV. THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
A. Criminal Prosecution of Internet-related Offenses Reveals a
Lack of Security
Criminal prosecution plays an important role in securing online
transactions by holding perpetrators of cybercrimes accountable
and deterring future crimes.  Since theft laws are perceived to be
1722398 (M.D. Pa. June 16, 2006) (dismissing the claim against the bank ); Banknorth,
442 F. Supp. 2d 206 (dismissing all claims against the merchant); Sovereign Bank v.
BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 2d 526 (M.D. Pa. 2006) (dismissing all claims
against the merchant); Pa. State Employees Credit Union, 398 F. Supp. 2d 317 (dis-
missing all claims against the merchant).
129. No. 05 C 4599, 2005 WL 2978755 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 3, 2005).
130. 444 F. Supp. 2d 775 (W.D. Mich. 2006).
131. Id. at 775.
132. Richardson, 2005 WL 2978755 at *20-21.
133. Hendricks, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 781.
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inadequate for the prosecution of cybercrimes, between 1978 and
1999 all fifty states and the federal government enacted computer
misuse statutes.134  Although the statutes differ in their approaches,
they usually contain a basic prohibition against unauthorized ac-
cess to computer systems, supplemented with additional elements
to define specific criminal offenses.135
In 1984 Congress enacted the first version of the federal com-
puter misuse statute—the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
(“CFAA”).136  The statute was intended to protect computers used
by the federal government and financial institutions.137  In 1986,
Congress amended the CFAA to add protection for “federal inter-
est computers.”138  The 1986 amendments included a replacement
of the phrase “federal interest computer” with “protected com-
puter.”139  Since any computer used in interstate commerce or
communications became a “protected computer” within the mean-
ing of the statute, the amendments extended the statutory protec-
tion to computers owned by state or local government entities and
private parties.140  The statute applies even if all involved com-
puters are located in the same state.141
The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropri-
ate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of
2001 (“USA Patriot Act”),142 the Cyber Security Enhancement Act
of 2002,143 and the Computer Software Privacy and Control Act of
2003144 included further changes to the CFAA.  Responding to the
growing concerns about cyberterrorism and cybercrimes, the new
legislation made it a criminal act to knowingly transmit a computer
program, code, or command that results in damage to a protected
134. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (West 2007); ORIN S. KERR, COMPUTER CRIME
LAW 27 (2006).
135. KERR, supra note 134, at 28.
136. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, § 2102(a),
98 Stat. 2190 (1984).
137. See id.  The statute made accessing classified information without authoriza-
tion a felony.  It also made unauthorized access to financial records or trespass into a
government computer a misdemeanor. S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 3 (1986).
138. See, e.g., Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F.
Supp. 2d 1121, 1127 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
139. See id. at 1128.
140. See, e.g., Ryan P. Allace et al., Computer Crimes, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 223,
229-30 (2005).
141. See id. at 230.
142. USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
143. Cyber Security Enhancement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 225, 116 Stat.
2135, 2156 (2002).
144. Computer Software Privacy and Control Act, H.R. 4255, 108th Cong. (2003).
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\35-1\FUJ106.txt unknown Seq: 22 18-JAN-08 8:30
168 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXV
computer regardless of whether the access to the protected com-
puter was authorized.145  The statute also criminalized unautho-
rized access that damages a protected computer even if the
intruder did not intend to cause the damage.146  In addition, the
statute penalized intentional unauthorized access to a protected
computer where the intruder obtained information from the pro-
tected computer.147
The CFAA also provides victims of computer crimes with a lim-
ited private cause of action for losses suffered.148  The plaintiff can
bring a civil action either for acts where the defendant intentionally
accessed a protected computer and caused losses during any one-
year period of at least $5000 or, in more rare cases, where the de-
fendant’s acts caused modification or impairment of medical
records, physical injury, a threat to public safety, or damaged a
government computer system.149
To complement the computer crime specific legislation, Congress
amended traditional criminal statutes to include crimes that in-
volved computers and included enhanced sentences for crimes
committed with the help of computers.150  For example, the Sen-
tencing Guidelines allow longer sentences for defendants that used
special skills—which includes computer skills—in the commission
of a crime.151  As the Ninth Circuit explained in United States v.
Mainard:
145. See Allace et al., supra note 140, at 231-32.
146. See id. at 232.
147. The statute provides:
(a) Whoever . . .
(2) intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds au-
thorized access, and thereby obtains
(A) information contained in a financial record of a financial institution, or
of a card issuer as defined in section 1602(n) of title 15, or contained in a file
of a consumer reporting agency on a consumer, as such terms are defined in
the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.);
(B) information from any department or agency of the United States; or
(C) information from any protected computer if the conduct involved an
interstate or foreign communication . . . .
18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(2) (West 2007).  This is the most frequently charged section
1030 crime. KERR, supra note 134, at 28.
148. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(g) (West 2007).
149. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(5)(B) (West 2007).  In practice, for example in spyware
cases, the $5000 threshold often prevents plaintiffs from bringing their civil actions
under the CFAA. See, e.g., Michael D. Lane, Note, Spies Among Us:  Can New Legis-
lation Stop Spyware from Bugging Your Computer?, 17 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 283,
293 (2005).
150. See Lane, supra note 149, at 229; see also Katyal, supra note 11 (arguing in
favor of stricter penalties when computers are used  to commit crimes).
151. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 (2005).
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In a sense, abuse of a special skill is a special kind of abuse of
trust.  It is a breach of the trust that society reposes in a person
when it enables him to acquire and have a skill that other mem-
bers of society do not possess. . . . When the person turns those
skills to evil deeds, a special wrong is perpetrated upon society,
just as other abuses of trust perpetrate a special wrong upon
their victims.152
Law enforcement agencies have successfully apprehended and
prosecuted a number of individuals under the CFAA for unautho-
rized access and misuse of computer systems.  For example, in
United States v. Phillips,153 a University of Texas student, in viola-
tion of the University’s acceptable computer use policy, gained un-
authorized access to government and private computers and
managed to accumulate a large volume of personal and proprietary
data, such as credit card and bank account information, birth
records, passwords, and Social Security numbers.  When the Uni-
versity’s Information Security Office learned about the suspicious
Internet activities of the student, it issued several warnings but
took no meaningful action.154  Moreover, the University admitted
Phillips, then an undergraduate student, to its graduate computer
science program.155  After Philips caused numerous crashes of uni-
versity computer systems, the University finally contacted the Se-
cret Service.156  Phillips was convicted in a jury trial on one count
of computer fraud under the CFAA157 and one count of possession
of an identification document containing stolen Social Security
numbers158 and was sentenced to five years probation, five hundred
hours of community service, and a restitution of $170,056.159
Although major financial services companies, which are heavily
regulated and audited by the government, generally provide much
better security for their computer systems than less regulated busi-
nesses, some smaller players in the financial services industry may
have insufficient information security controls.160  For example, in
United States v. Marles, the defendant, a former employee of a
credit card company, gained unauthorized access to his personal
152. 5 F.3d 404, 406 (9th Cir. 1993).
153. 477 F.3d 215, 218 (5th Cir. 2007).
154. Id. at 217-18.
155. Id. at 217.
156. Id. at 218.
157. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(5)(A), (B)(i) (West 2007).
158. Phillips, 477 F.3d at 218; see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 1028(a)(6) (West 2007).
159. Phillips, 477 F.3d at 218-19.
160. See infra Part IV.B for a discussion of government regulation of information
security.
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account using the expertise he gained as an employee and fraudu-
lently increased his credit line to be able to transfer balances from
his higher interest rate credit cards.161  The defendant pleaded
guilty to computer fraud and was sentenced under the CFAA.162
Clearly, the credit card company did not have proper access con-
trols in place to prevent former employees from accessing its com-
puter systems.
In United States v. Willis, the Tenth Circuit upheld a conviction
under the CFAA163 of a debt collecting agency employee who pro-
vided criminals with access credentials to a LexisNexis Web site,
which enabled the criminals to commit identity theft and credit
card fraud.164  Apparently, the employee was the sole person re-
sponsible for creating and revoking LexisNexis access privileges
of the debt collecting agency employees,165 a clear violation of ba-
sic information security principles.166
United States v. Ivanov was a rare case where United States law
enforcement successfully apprehended and prosecuted a foreign
hacker in the United States under the CFAA for conspiracy, com-
puter fraud, extortion, and possession of unauthorized access de-
vices.167  The hacker broke into a U.S. financial transaction
processing company’s computer systems and demanded payment
for his assistance in making those systems secure.168  The com-
pany’s failure to secure its computer systems made the break-in
possible.
Despite these successful prosecutions, many cybercrimes go un-
punished because of the immense technical complexities in investi-
gating these crimes and finding their perpetrators.169  Nevertheless,
criminal prosecution of online fraud serves as a deterrent contrib-
uting to the security of online transactions.  As will be discussed in
Part V, crime prosecution together with government regulation
161. 408 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D. Me. 2006).
162. Id. at 39.
163. See U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(2)(C), (c)(2)(B)(iii) (West 2007).
164. 476 F.3d 1121, 1123 (10th Cir. 2007).
165. Id.
166. One of the basic information security principles is a separation of duties where
no employee can single-handedly perform a critical business function.  For example,
creation of access credentials must require participation of one or more additional
employees or supervisors who verify the legitimacy of the action and approve it. See,
e.g., David Ferraiolo & Richard Kuhn, Role-Based Access Controls (National Institute
of Standards and Technology 1995), available at http://hissa.nist.gov/rbac/paper/rbac1.
html.
167. 175 F. Supp. 2d 367, 369 (D. Conn. 2001).
168. Id.
169. See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 11, at 1074-75.
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and private legal actions constitute an integral element of an effec-
tive cybercrime prevention scheme.
B. The Financial Industry as an Example of Government
Regulation of Information Security
Extensive government regulation reaches practically all aspects
of the financial industry, including information security.170  Finan-
cial institutions are constantly working on improving the security of
their online systems in order to ensure compliance with govern-
ment regulation and make their clients feel safe online.171
The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
(“FFIEC”) prescribes uniform principles, standards, and examina-
tion procedures to promote consistency in the supervision of finan-
cial institutions by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the National
Credit Union Administration, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, and the Office of Thrift Supervision.172  The FFIEC In-
formation Technology Examination Handbook (the “Handbook”)
consists of several booklets that cover various aspects of financial
institutions’ information technology operations.173  The Handbook
provides a framework for the examination of financial institutions’
information technology infrastructure by government agencies;174
and provides guidance to financial institutions in their day-to-day
technology operations.175  The Information Security booklet of the
Handbook contains more than a hundred pages addressing all as-
pects of information security governance, policies, procedures, and
their implementation.176
FFIEC views information security as an ongoing process, where
financial institutions should have proper controls in place to pro-
170. The major legislative acts regulating financial institutions include the Bank
Service Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1867(c); Bank Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1882;
Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, 15 U.S.C. §1681w; Gramm–Leach–Bliley
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6801 and § 6805(b); Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030.  Supervising agencies implement these legislative acts through regulations and
guidance letters.
171. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 10, at 19.
172. See FFIEC Web site, http://www.ffiec.gov (last visited Nov. 17, 2007).
173. FFIEC, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY EXAMINATION HANDBOOK, http://www.
ffiec.gov/ffiecinfobase/html_pages/it_01.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2007).
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. See FFIEC, IT EXAMINATION HANDBOOK, INFORMATION SECURITY (2006),
http://www.ffiec.gov/ffiecinfobase/booklets/information_security/information_secur-
ity.pdf.
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vide effective day-to-day management of information security and
appropriate responses to changing threats, business conditions, and
new technologies.177  Financial institutions must identify and man-
age security risks by implementing appropriate countermeasures,
testing the implementations, and subsequently monitoring residual
risks.178  With great detail, FFIEC specifies other aspects of infor-
mation security, such as access controls, including the administra-
tion of access rights, user authentication, use of encryption,
prevention of malicious code, software development practices, per-
sonnel security, including background checks and screening, data
security, intrusion detection, security incident response practices,
management of outsourced systems, and physical security of the
premises.179
To strengthen IT compliance, FFIEC prescribes internal audit
procedures for financial institutions.180  In addition, the supervising
government agencies conduct regular audits of financial institu-
tions within their sphere of responsibility and, in the case of viola-
tions, take appropriate enforcement actions.181
This process ensures that financial institutions comply with all
applicable laws and regulations, including government-mandated
information security standards.  While this extensive regulation is
necessary to ensure stability and security of the national financial
system and to prevent crimes, including online fraud, it is very ex-
pensive for both the government and financial institutions.
V. DISCUSSION:  A CASE FOR FEDERAL INFORMATION
SECURITY LEGISLATION
A. Market-based Approach to Information Security
Despite the efforts of the software companies and financial ser-
vices industry to improve security of online transactions,182 some
observers are skeptical about the industry’s ability to do so.183
They point out that the industry is predominantly concerned about
177. See id. at 1.
178. See id. at 10-15.
179. See id. at 22-95.
180. FFIEC, IT EXAMINATION HANDBOOK, AUDIT (2003), http://www.ffiec.gov/
ffiecinfobase/booklets/audit.pdf.
181. For example, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency regulates national
banks, federally chartered branches, and agencies of foreign banks. See FFIEC, En-
forcement Actions and Orders, http://www.ffiec.gov/enforcement.htm (last visited
Nov. 17, 2007).
182. See supra Part III.A for a discussion of these efforts.
183. See, e.g., Charney, supra note 2, at 945.
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its bottom line and uses return-on-investment as the main metric
that drives business decisions.184  There are good reasons for this
skepticism.  For example, in their cost reduction effort, United
States corporations, including major financial institutions, increas-
ingly send work abroad together with sensitive personal and finan-
cial information about their customers.185  This inevitably increases
the risk of security breaches and identity theft.186
Numerous security breaches show that many companies still do
not take the security of their computer systems seriously enough.
The 2006 theft of 45.6 million credit card numbers and personal
information of approximately 451,000 individuals from TJX was
the biggest information security breach in history.187  In March
2007, law enforcement agencies in Florida arrested several individ-
uals suspected to be part of a fraudulent scheme that used credit
card information stolen from TJX.188  According to Mark Pullen, a
manager at RSA Security, by 2010 many industries will have to
deal with the same security issues that threaten online financial
transactions today, and most will not be ready for the challenge.189
184. See id.
185. See, e.g., Stan Gibson, No Retreat:  Continue Outsourcing Despite Global Ter-
ror, EWEEK.COM, July 19, 2006, available at http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,199
1268,00.asp.
186. See Samantha Grant, “I Just Bought a Flat Screen T.V. in Kolkata?” Applica-
tion of Laws for International Outsourcing Related Identity Theft, 11 PGH J. TECH. L.
& POL’Y 1, 2-5 (2006).
187. See Jaikumar Vijayan, TJX Data Breach:  At 45.6M Card Numbers, It’s the
Biggest Ever, COMPUTERWORLD, Mar. 29, 2007, available at http://www.computer
world.com/action/article.do?command=ViewArticleBasic&articleId=9014782.  Re-
cent information indicates that, contrary to the numbers TJX disclosed to the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission in March of 2007, the security breach may have
compromised as many as ninety-four million accounts. See Jaikumar Vijayan, Update:
TJX Victim Tally Rises to 94M, COMPUTERWORLD, Oct. 29, 2007, available at http://
www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=ViewArticleBasic&articleId=
306333&source=NLT_SEC&nlid=38.  The future will show whether the action that a
number of financial institutions recently filed against TJX will share the fate of similar
suits against B.J.’s. See Jaikumar Vijayan, Scope of TJX data breach doubles:  94M
cards now said to be affected, COMPUTERWORLD, Oct. 24, 2007, available at http://
www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=ViewArticleBasic&articleId=
9043944&pageNumber=1 (reporting that a number of financial institutions are seek-
ing a class action certification for the lawsuit they filed against TJX in Boston, Massa-
chusetts, seeking compensation for the losses they suffered as a result of the breach);
see also supra Part III.B for a discussion of suits against B.J.’s in 2005 and 2006.
188. Matt Hines, Stolen TJX Data Used in Florida Crime Spree, INFOWORLD, Mar.
21, 2007, available at http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=
ViewArticleBasic&articleId=9013942.
189. Michael Crawford, 2010:  A Security Odyssey, COMPUTERWORLD AUSTL., Nov.
16, 2006, available at http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=
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From a cost-benefit perspective, it may cost a financial institu-
tion or a merchant less to accept, at least to some extent, online
fraud as a business risk and to reimburse customers who suffer
losses, rather than to implement and maintain a comprehensive in-
formation security infrastructure.  From a public policy perspec-
tive, however, it is desirable to ensure adequate private sector
spending on information security in order to reduce identity theft
threats from organized crime and terror networks.190  Ultimately,
consumers will have to foot the bill whether businesses spend
money paying off cybercriminals, or on improving the security of
conducting business online.
Despite the widely publicized efforts of software vendors to im-
prove security of their products,191 software industry observers re-
ported forty percent more security vulnerabilities in 2006 than in
2005, with the major software companies being the biggest offend-
ers.192  Some software vendors use what amounts to security de-
fects in their products to force customers to subscribe to their paid
update services or to pay for upgrades to newer versions of their
products by discontinuing security fixes for the older ones.193
Other software vendors use security concerns to create new reve-
nue streams by offering new products instead of spending money
on improving the security of their existing product offerings.194
The growing sophistication of cybercriminal attacks and the ap-
parent inability of the software industry to prevent them because
of the inherent conflict of interests between performance-based
metrics and solid but inevitably expensive information security
programs suggests that technology alone is unable to resolve the
current security issues.
The next Section continues this discussion with an overview of
the difficulties facing law enforcement agencies charged with inves-
tigating cybercrimes and bringing the perpetrators to justice.  The
discussion suggests that these difficulties significantly diminish the
ViewArticleBasic&taxonomyName=Spam__Malware_and_Vulnerabilities&articleId
=9005164&taxonomyId=85&intsrc=kc_li_story.
190. See supra Part I.A.
191. See supra Part III.A for a discussion of these efforts.
192. Greenemeier & Hoover, Hacker Economy, supra note 20, at 39 (reporting that
in 2006 the number of detected security vulnerabilities in software products reached
7247).
193. See, e.g., Douglas A. Barnes, Deworming the Internet, 83 TEX. L. REV. 279,
295-97 (2004).
194. See, e.g., id.
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deterrent effect of criminal prosecution, especially when criminals
launch their attacks from overseas.
B. Criminal Prosecution
Criminal investigations of complex cybercrimes require exten-
sive resources and specialized technical expertise.195  Industrialized
production of increasingly sophisticated malware makes it even
more difficult for law enforcement to investigate cybercrimes.196
To reduce the risk of being caught and to thwart criminal investiga-
tions, malware creators developed anti-forensic software designed
to remove all traces of the intrusion, thus further complicating
investigations.197
Moreover, despite a number of successful prosecutions of cyber-
criminals,198 law enforcement agencies cannot keep up with the
growing cyberthreat because of its transnational nature.199  Conse-
quently, law enforcement agencies must rely on the cooperation of
the private sector and foreign governments in their fight against
cybercrime.200  For example, last year, FBI Cyber Action teams re-
lied on the cooperation of Microsoft and other private and public
organizations in tracing the attack of the Zotob malware to a credit
card theft ring in Morocco and Turkey.201  Relying on this assis-
tance, the FBI was able to help local authorities track down and
arrest some of the perpetrators.202
Although courts have upheld the extraterritorial application of
the CFAA,203 when cybercriminals perpetrate malicious acts in the
United States from overseas, law enforcement agencies are often
195. See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 11, at 1071-75.
196. See supra Part I.B for a discussion of commercialized production and distribu-
tion of hacker tools.
197. Kelly Jackson Higgins, Tools Fight Forensics, DARK READING, Mar. 19, 2007,
http://www.darkreading.com/document.asp?f_src=dr_csi_one&doc_id=119806.
198. See supra Part IV.A.
199. See, e.g., Greenemeier & Hoover, Hacker Economy, supra note 20, at 39.
200. See, e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI Cyber Action Teams Traveling
the World to Catch Cyber Criminals (Mar. 6, 2006), http://www.fbi.gov/page2/march
06/cats030606.htm.
201. See id.
202. Id.
203. See, e.g., United States v. Ivanov, 175 F. Supp. 2d 367 (D. Conn. 2001) (noting
that Congress intended the CFAA to be applied extraterritorially and upholding the
indictment under the CFAA where a Russian hacker broke into computers in the
United States while he was physically located in Russia).  Some commentators argue
against this broad interpretation of the statute. See, e.g., Mark Rasch, Ashcroft’s
Global Internet Power-Grab, BUS. WK., Nov. 26, 2001, available at http://www.busi-
nessweek.com/technology/content/nov2001/tc20011126_6812.htm.
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unable to investigate the perpetrators, apprehend them, and bring
them to justice.204  “The fundamental issue is that we have a law
enforcement model that’s geographically based, but there’s no ge-
ography on the Internet,” explained Dan Kaminsky, a security ex-
pert with DoxPara Research.205  Since cybercriminals can quickly
destroy forensic evidence of their malicious acts, the investigation
of cybercrimes requires swift and decisive actions by law enforce-
ment agencies.  United States law enforcement, however, may not
be able to wiretap criminals overseas or conduct searches, seizures,
or arrests without the close and timely cooperation of local author-
ities.206  The cooperation of local authorities varies widely from
country to country and depends, for example, on the existence of a
mutual legal assistance agreement between a particular foreign
country and the United States.207  In the absence of a mutual legal
assistance agreement, which makes assistance obligatory, in order
to obtain evidence from a foreign country, American law enforce-
ment agencies have to rely on letters rogatory, a judicial procedure
enabling one country to request judicial assistance from another on
a basis of comity.208  The U.S. Justice Department warns, however,
that this process may take a year or more, and even in urgent cases,
will likely take more than a month.209
All this undermines the deterrent and retributional effects of
federal criminal law with regard to domestic, and especially, for-
eign cybercriminals.  To compensate for this, some academic au-
thors suggest steeper penalties for online crimes.210  As discussed in
the next Section, however, a better approach would be to focus
primarily on the prevention of cybercrimes with criminal prosecu-
tion, with civil litigation playing an important but secondary role in
ensuring online security.
204. See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 11, at 1074-75.
205. See Greenemeier & Hoover, Hacker Economy, supra note 20, at 38-39. R
206. See id. at 39.
207. See for example, Bruce Zagaris, Uncle Sam Extends Reach for Evidence
Worldwide, 15 CRIM. JUST. 4 (2001), for a detailed discussion of mutual legal assis-
tance agreements.
208. See id.
209. See KERR, supra note 134, at 602 (quoting U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., U.S. ATT’YS
MANUAL, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 275 (1997)).
210. Id.  Other authors are skeptical, however, about the deterrent effect of such
proposals. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in
the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules:  At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO.
L.J. 949, 954-55 (2003).
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C. The Role of Government Regulation and Private Legal
Actions in Enforcing Information Security
The common theme of the criminal and civil cases discussed in
Parts III and IV was the systematic failure of businesses, universi-
ties, and other organizations to follow sound information security
policies and procedures, maintain an adequate level of information
security, and protect their computer systems from unauthorized ac-
cess by insiders, former employees, and malicious hackers located
in the United States and abroad.211   Due diligence in maintaining
information system security would have prevented most of these
cybercrimes and made fraudulent transactions virtually impossible.
As discussed above, market forces alone will likely be insuffi-
cient to ensure adequate security of online transactions.212  Gov-
ernment-mandated information security standards can help
achieve this goal.  Extensive government regulation of information
security in financial institutions already plays a critical role in en-
suring safety of online financial transactions.213  Government regu-
lation of information security combined with private enforcement
of government-mandated information security standards and vigor-
ous prosecution of computer crimes may be the optimal and cost-
effective solution for improving the security of online transactions.
1. Enforcing Information Security Through Private Legal
Actions Under Current Law
The threat of private actions by defrauded individuals and busi-
ness organizations against negligent businesses and government
agencies that failed to protect their confidential information may
force organizations to treat information security issues seriously.214
In such actions, however, plaintiffs face multiple challenges.
Usually the plaintiff has to show damages that resulted from the
defendant’s failure to provide adequate protection for plaintiff’s
personal data.215  Also, in most cases losses from Internet crimes
211. See, e.g., United States v. Zenski, 125 F.3d 845 (2d Cir. 1997) (successful prose-
cution of criminal group that used a hacker to break into computer systems and steal
credit card information for subsequent use in fraudulent transactions); United States
v. Petersen, 98 F.3d 502 (9th Cir. 1996) (successful prosecution of a hacker for credit
card and other computer-related fraud).
212. See supra Part V.A.
213. See supra Part IV.B.
214. See supra notes 110-113 and accompanying text. R
215. Hendricks v. DSW Shoe Warehouse, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 775 (W.D. Mich.
2006) (dismissing a class action where the plaintiff attempted to recover for the cost of
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do not exceed one thousand dollars.216  Therefore, it is impractical
for an individual plaintiff to sue a negligent party that failed to
secure plaintiff’s personal information unless the plaintiff’s dam-
ages resulted from a massive security breach and the plaintiff can
bring her suit as a class action on behalf of all similarly affected
individuals.
Plaintiffs who attempt to bring such class actions, however, face
numerous obstacles in pursuing their claims.  For example, despite
the global nature of the Internet, plaintiffs usually have to bring
their class actions under state law, where differences in substantive
law and choice of law rules across states may prevent the plaintiffs’
attempts to certify their suits as nationwide class actions.217
2. Imposing Tort Liability on the Software Industry
Some commentators argue that the software industry is mature
enough to be held strictly liable in tort for damages caused by de-
fects in its products.218  The likely response from the computer in-
dustry would be to market devices with very limited functionality.
This strict liability approach is appropriate for specialized devices,
combining both hardware and software components and intended
for very specific purposes, such as medical monitoring devices,
power plant control systems, or network security appliances.  In
this case, the imposition of liability on the manufacturers of such
devices for injuries and damage caused by their failure is certainly
justified by the need to compensate victims and ensure reliability
of the device’s software and hardware components.
credit monitoring and identity theft prevention after the theft of customer informa-
tion from defendant’s computers).
216. NATIONAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME CENTER & FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTI-
GATION, supra note 18, at 8 (reporting that the median dollar loss from Internet
crimes in 2006 was $724).
217. See generally Richard H. Acker, Choice-Of-Law Questions in Cyberfraud,
1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 437 (1996); see also Drooger v. Carlisle Tire & Wheel Co., No.
1:05-CV-73, 2006 WL 1008719, at *22 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 18, 2006) (“[I]f this case were
certified as a nationwide class action, the Court would have to try the case under the
laws of the 50 states. . . .  While not necessarily the death knell to certification, a
nationwide class under every state’s law would only be permissible were there no
conflicts of law.”); Michael Ena, Comment, Choice of Law and Predictability of Deci-
sions in Product Liability Cases, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1417 (2007) (pointing out
that choice of law rules adopted by a particular state may limit plaintiffs’ ability to
bring their suits as class actions in that state).
218. Frances E. Zollers et al., No More Soft Landings for Software:  Liability for
Defects in an Industry that Has Come of Age, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 745, 780-82 (2005).
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A strict liability approach, however, is not appropriate for to-
day’s general-purpose computers and the software designed to run
on them.  Imposition of such liability will make software prohibi-
tively costly or significantly reduce the wide variety of features of-
fered by today’s software products and impede the flexibility
computer owners enjoy in picking and choosing software for their
computers.  At this time, neither consumers, legislators, nor the
software industry itself seem ready for the imposition of across-the-
board liability for defects in software products.
3. Private Actions as a Means of Improving Information Security
Practices at Government Agencies
Attempts to use private actions to improve information security
in government agencies did not bring much success either.  For ex-
ample, in Cobell v. Kempthorne, beneficiaries of Individual Indian
Money trust accounts held by the United States government
brought an action under the Administrative Procedure Act219 and
the common law of trusts220 against the federal government trustee
seeking inter alia injunctive relief to force the Department of the
Interior to disconnect from the network computer systems holding
Indian trust data to protect its integrity and confidentiality.221  De-
spite the shameful state of information system security at the De-
partment of the Interior,222 the D.C. Circuit overturned the
preliminary injunction granted by the district court due to a lack of
an “imminent threat” or “specific reason” to be concerned that the
trust data stored in the Department’s computers was a target.223
Unfortunately, the Cobell court did not understand that any per-
sonal or financial information stored in any computer system con-
nected to the Internet is a target for malicious hackers who are
constantly probing computer systems for vulnerabilities in an at-
tempt to gain unauthorized access to information and exploit it for
illegal financial gains.
219. 5 U.S.C.A. § 706 (West 2007).
220. See, e.g., U.S. v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 226 (1983) (“It is well established that a
trustee is accountable in damages for breaches of trust.” (citing RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 205-212 (1959))).
221. 455 F.3d 301 (D.C. Cir. 2006).  The plaintiffs relied on the common law of
trusts and the Administrative Procedure Act, which allows courts to compel an ad-
ministrative agency action that is unlawfully or unreasonably withheld. Id. at 304.
222. Id. at 308-10 (citing numerous vulnerabilities in the Interior’s computer sys-
tems reported by several information security contractors who conducted penetration
tests).
223. Id. at 315-17.
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4. Civil Remedies Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
Overall, given the global nature of the Internet, state civil reme-
dies that vary from state to state cannot serve as a way of enforcing
and promoting consistent information security measures aimed at
prevention of online fraud.
Federal civil remedies provided by the CFAA, however, are
more closely aligned with the cross-jurisdictional nature of the In-
ternet.  But in many cases perpetrators of cybercrimes are either
judgment proof, impossible to locate, or the total cost of litigation
far exceeds the value of the remedy the court provides.  For exam-
ple, in Tyco International (U.S.) Inc. v. John Does, 1-3, the plaintiff,
an ISP, sued a spammer for overloading the ISP’s e-mail servers,
alleging trespass to chattels and violation of the CFAA.224  The ISP
sought to enjoin the spammer from accessing its computer systems
under the CFAA225 and to recover damages, attorney’s fees, and
costs.226  The court granted the injunction, awarded $10,621 in
damages and costs, and denied recovery of attorney’s fees.227  The
ISP, however, spent $136,000 just to track down the spammer.228
As the Tyco case shows, the ex post compensatory damages and
injunctive relief that the CFAA provides229 are unlikely to make
most of the victims of cybercrimes whole since the perpetrators are
usually either judgment proof or very difficult, if not impossible, to
locate and bring to justice.  Therefore, suggestions to focus legisla-
tive effort on the new means used to perpetrate cybercrimes or on
the consequences of such crimes rather than the inadequate secur-
ity measures that made those crimes possible230 will not yield effec-
tive means for combating and prevent cybercrimes.
224. No. 01 Civ.3856(RCC), 2003 WL 23374767, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2003).
225. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(g) (West 2007).  The statute provides:  “Any person who
suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of this section may maintain a civil
action against the violator to obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief . . . .”
Id.
226. Tyco Int’l (U.S.) Inc., 2003 WL 23374767, at *1.
227. Id. at *7.
228. Id. at *1.
229. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(g) (West 2007).
230. See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner, Law in an Era of Pervasive Technology, 15 WID-
ENER L.J. 667, 768-84 (2006) (criticizing the reactive approach of the federal legisla-
ture to the emerging technology trends where new legislation focuses on new ways to
perpetrate criminal acts and suggesting that instead the legislative efforts should focus
on the harm resulting from cybercrimes).
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5. Proposal for Federal Information Security Legislation
According to recent research, sixty percent of information secur-
ity incidents between 1980 and 2006 resulted from organizational
mismanagement.231  Moreover, most of the thirty-one percent of
breaches attributed to hackers232 likely resulted from failures of or-
ganizations to maintain adequate security of their networks and
computer systems.  Therefore, businesses and government institu-
tions can eliminate most of the security breaches by adhering to
sound information security practices.  Given the cross-jurisdic-
tional nature of the Internet, there is a need for federal legislation
mandating information security standards for online transactions to
ensure consistent implementation and enforcement of information
security policies and procedures across the country, including col-
lection, storage, and dissemination of personally identifiable
information.233
First, ex post remedies are usually inadequate to compensate vic-
tims of computer crimes.  Therefore, if a particular organization
stores personal or financial information in computer systems lack-
ing adequate security and protection from unauthorized access,
even before any security breach occurs, the affected individuals
should have a right under federal law to seek injunctive relief and
force the organization to fix security issues or refrain from collect-
ing and storing sensitive data.
Second, federal law should also provide victims of cybercrimes
with a right to hold organizations accountable for the harm caused
by cyberattacks launched from their negligently maintained com-
231. Lisa Vaas, Corporations Bear Brunt of Blame, EWK., Apr. 2, 2007, at 17.  This
does not mean that all these incidents resulted in actual damage to the individuals and
organizations whose information was compromised.  For example, information on lost
magnetic media or stolen laptop computers does not necessarily end up in the hands
of cybercriminals willing to exploit it.
232. Id.
233. Some argue that uniform government-mandated information security stan-
dards may be “unworkable.” See, e.g., Kenneth M. Siegel, Comment, Protecting the
Most Valuable Corporate Asset:  Electronic Data, Identity Theft, Personal Information,
and the Role of Data Security in the Information Age, 111 PENN. ST. L. REV. 779, 821
(2007) (“Even if we ignore the fact that technology changes at a rapid pace, effective
data security is very dependent upon each individual company’s business, making a
one-size-fits-all approach to information security unworkable.”).  The problem, how-
ever, is that it does not make much difference to malicious hackers whether they
manage to steal credit card numbers from a major retailer or from a small mom and
pop online store.  Likewise, it does not make any difference for the customers who
suffer losses as a result of the breach.  Therefore, any business storing personally iden-
tifiable information should adhere to the strict government-mandated uniform infor-
mation security standards or refrain from retaining such information.
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puter systems and networks.234  Unlike cybercriminals, these de-
fendants are not judgment proof and are relatively easy to locate
and identify.  Unlike individual Internet users, they have resources
and expertise to secure their networks and computer systems.235  In
addition, courts will not have any significant difficulty in asserting
personal jurisdiction over such defendants.236
Third, federal information security standards should provide a
uniform data classification scheme requiring stricter protection for
more sensitive information.  Organizations, therefore, will have a
choice to either retain certain sensitive data and provide an ade-
quate level of protection or refrain from retaining that data and
avoid the related expenses.  Federal information security standards
should require business organizations, universities, and govern-
ment agencies to establish well-defined information security man-
agement policies and procedures; ensure adequate data protection
and malware prevention; maintain strict access control;  provide
training and screening of the personnel; and adhere to sound
software development practices.
Fourth, the standards should impose certain technological solu-
tions aimed at improving online security.  For example, the stan-
dards may mandate that organizations monitor outgoing network
traffic and prevent their network users from concealing their iden-
tity by altering (“spoofing”) the originating address on their e-
mails or network packets.  Further, the standards should require
ISPs to deny their services to customers spoofing their addresses.
These measures would make it easier to track down perpetrators of
spam and DDoS attacks, thus increasing the deterrence effect of
criminal justice.  Also, ISPs should be required to ensure the secur-
ity of their customers’ computers and deny Internet access to cus-
tomers whose computers are missing required security software
and updates.  One cannot expect that all users will secure their
computers unless ISPs ensure compliance.237
234. See, e.g., Doug Lichtman & Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers
Accountable, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CYBERSECURITY (Mark Grady &
Francesco Parisi eds., 2005).
235. Cf. Henderson & Yarbrough, supra note 28 (arguing for holding negligent
computer owners liable for damages caused by computer misuse facilitated by the
owners’ failure to maintain adequate security of their computers).
236. Robert Louis B. Stevenson, Note, Plugging the “Phishing” Hole:  Legislation
Versus Technology, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 6 (2005) (emphasizing difficulty in
finding perpetrators of cybercrimes and obtaining personal jurisdiction over them).
237. But c.f. Siegel, supra note 233, at 821 (implying that users will educate them-
selves about online threats and secure their computers by installing firewalls, anti-
virus software, and the latest security patches).
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Imposition of liability under federal law for failure to comply
with the information security standards would deter negligent be-
havior and promote uniformity and consistency of information sys-
tem security across the nation.  It is important, however, to
carefully implement information security legislation, maintaining a
proper balance between ensuring security and preventing excessive
liability that may adversely affect the progress of society.238  New
legislation should not open technology companies and businesses,
which use new technology to deliver their goods and services, to
the expense of unlimited litigation and unpredictable damage
awards.  Reasonable efforts to comply with federally-mandated in-
formation security standards should be sufficient to protect busi-
nesses from liability.
It is also important that new legislation does not result in the
over-regulation of technologies that can be used to commit crimes,
thus preventing victims of computer crimes and investigators from
using the same technologies to investigate criminal activity and
track down the perpetrators of computer crimes.239
CONCLUSION
As discussed in Part V, once a cybercrime is committed, it is
highly unlikely that the perpetrators will be held accountable and
will compensate the victim for the sustained losses.  Investigation
and criminal prosecution of cybercrime is difficult, and many
crimes go unpunished.  At the same time, self-regulation and mar-
ket forces do not necessarily ensure security of online transactions
because of the inherent conflict of interests in the industry.240
Many computer-related crimes are not even reported because busi-
nesses try to avoid bad publicity and the potential loss of customer
confidence.241  Since private legal actions under the current law
usually do not result in adequate compensation for cybercrime vic-
tims either,242 crime prevention becomes the key to ensuring the
238. Cf. Vincent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of Tort
Liability, 57 S.C. L. REV. 255, 311 (2005) (warning about maintaining a proper bal-
ance between loss distribution and limits on liability in tort actions arising from iden-
tity theft).
239. Beryl A. Howell, Real World Problems of Virtual Crime, 7 YALE J.L. & TECH.
103, 122 (2005) (warning about the dangers that ill-defined legal norms may pose for
computer crime victims engaged in a self-help effort to combat computer crime and
track down the perpetrators).
240. See supra Part V.A.
241. See supra Part V.A.
242. See supra Part V.C.1
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security of online transactions.  Therefore, there is a need for com-
prehensive federal regulation and oversight combined with appro-
priate legislation extending rights of private parties to enforce
government-mandated security standards and demand adequate
security from the organizations handling their private information.
Government organizations, businesses, and individuals should also
have a legal right to recover their losses from organizations whose
negligence in maintaining computer systems security precipitated
cybercrime regardless of who committed the actual crime.
These measures would improve online security and reduce
crime.  As a result, law enforcement agencies would be able to in-
vestigate and prosecute a higher percentage of cybercrimes, thus
increasing the deterrent effect of criminal justice.
As more businesses and government agencies move online, se-
curing online transactions through the prevention of cybercrimes
becomes critical both in protecting against fraud, cutting off a sub-
stantial source of illegal income for organized crime and terrorist
organizations, as well as ensuring further growth of the national
economy.
